

# SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE BULLETIN

## BULLETIN NO 7

### Highlights and Key Remarks from the Policy Brief on an Emergency Platform ([page 1](#)) followed by informal consultations with Member States ([page 4](#)) and Stakeholders ([page 15](#))

Summit of the Future (SOTF) Information Clearinghouse Bulletin is an independent initiative to objectively present the key elements and highlights of the SOTF preparatory meetings taking place at the United Nations.

Note: Excerpts have been quoted directly from the policy briefs and statements made by MS & others (non-italicized)

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#### DISCLAIMER:

This bulletin is intended to provide an overview of the latest developments and is not a comprehensive summary or record of the SOTF preparatory process. When reporting on statements made by Member States, the bulletin presents key highlights and remarks and the full statements have been hyperlinked if available on the [UN Journal](#) website. This information service is a collaborative endeavor supported by Action for Sustainable Development, Coalition for the UN We Need, Global Governance Innovation Network, International Development Law Organization, and the Present and Future Institute. This report was prepared independently with support from project partners. However, the content of the report does not reflect the specific views of any of the partner organizations. Contact Fergus Watt ([ferguswatt6@gmail.com](mailto:ferguswatt6@gmail.com)) for more information on this information service. Material is not copyrighted and can be distributed freely.

## Policy Brief 2 – Strengthening the International Response to Complex Global Shocks – An Emergency Platform

**ABOUT:** Building on the proposals presented in Our Common Agenda report, the Secretary-General (SG) is publishing a [series](#) of Policy Briefs over 2023 to serve as inputs into the preparations for the Summit of the Future (SOTF). The Policy Brief on an [Emergency Platform](#) is the second one in that series.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

*The Emergency Platform would not be a new permanent or standing body or institution but a set of protocols. It would be triggered automatically in crises of sufficient scale and magnitude, regardless of the type or nature of the crisis involved. Once activated, it would bring together leaders from Member States (MS), the UN system, key country groupings, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional bodies, civil society, the private sector, subject-specific industries or research bodies, and other experts. This would allow the convening role of the UN to be maximized in the face of crises with global reach.*

**Definition of a Global Shock** – A complex global shock can be broadly understood as an event with severely disruptive consequences for a significant proportion of the global population that leads to secondary impacts across multiple sectors (for example, COVID-19). Not every crisis or shock should be classified as complex or global. Local, national or regional shocks that do not have global consequences would not necessarily be included. Complex global shocks could include,

- ❖ Large-scale climatic or environmental events that cause major socioeconomic disruptions and/or environmental degradation
- ❖ Future pandemics with cascading secondary impacts
- ❖ High-impact events involving a biological agent (deliberate or accidental)
- ❖ Events leading to disruptions to global flows of goods, people or finance
- ❖ Large-scale destructive and/or disruptive activity in cyberspace/disruptions to global digital connectivity
- ❖ A major event in outer space that causes severe disruptions to one or several critical systems on Earth
- ❖ Unforeseen risks (“black swan” events)

**Current Deficiencies** – We lack the necessary forums at the global level to tackle multidimensional threats with a multidimensional response. Our global response is too often hampered by the absence of incentives for multilateral entities to contribute to collective results, and accountability mechanisms and mandates that do not encourage collaboration and joined-up efforts. We are often too slow to convene the right actors at the right level, and we lack the means to collaborate and coordinate across sectors and communicate clearly on what needs to be done.

**PROPOSAL:** The SG and the UN system be given standing authority by the General Assembly (GA) to convene and operationalize automatically an EP in the event of a future complex global shock of sufficient scale, severity and reach.

### Key Principles of the Emergency Platform:

- ✚ Flexibility and Agility
- ✚ Solidarity and Equity
- ✚ Strengthened Coordination
- ✚ Interdisciplinary and Multisectoral
- ✚ Inclusive and Multi-stakeholder
- ✚ Ability to secure commitments and hold actors to account
- ✚ Leverage existing operational and coordination response mechanisms

**Decision to Convene** – The SG would decide when to convene an Emergency Platform. In advance of the decision, the SG would consult with – the President of the GA; the President of the Security Council (as appropriate); relevant national authorities and/or regional organizations; relevant UN entities, specialized agencies, IFIs and other multilateral institutions and agencies that have been mandated by MS to respond to sector-specific crises.

The factors that would be considered as part of the decision to convene an Emergency Platform could include – severity of a crisis; reach of a crisis; complexity of a crisis; and existing coordination and operational response mechanism.

### **High-Level Objectives:**

- High-level political leadership
- Ensure equity and solidarity in the international response
- Coherent multilateral response
- Inclusive and networked multilateralism
- Advocacy and strategic communications
- Secure commitments and hold key actors to account for supporting the global response

**Time Frame** – An Emergency Platform should initially be convened for a finite period to respond to a specific shock. At the end of that period, the SG could extend the work of an Emergency Platform if required, but it would not become a standing body or entity.

**Organizational Matters** – Once a decision has been taken to convene and operationalize an Emergency Platform, multilateral entities with technical expertise relevant to the nature of the complex global shock would be requested to provide staff secondments to support the work of the Emergency Platform. Seconded staff would constitute a task team responsible for operationalizing the Emergency Platform and would provide all necessary forms of support for the duration of an Emergency Platform.

Upon activation of an Emergency Platform, initial operating costs would be met from existing resources. Thereafter, UN entities and other relevant actors would be asked to provide support for the day-to-day running of the Emergency Platform, including through the secondment of technical experts. In addition, there could be a requirement to mobilize financial resources for specific response activities, subject to relevant factors including the type of shock, the appropriateness of existing sector-specific financing tools and the scale of the crisis. Upon convening and operationalizing an Emergency Platform, the SG would provide regular reporting to the GA on the activities of the Emergency Platform.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MS:**


- ❖ Recognize that a strengthened international response to complex global shocks must be flexible in order to respond to different types of global shocks, promote equity and solidarity, ensure coherence of the multilateral system, be multisectoral and interdisciplinary and allow for the participation of relevant multi-stakeholder actors, and must align with existing coordination and response mechanisms;
- ❖ Decide that the SG has a standing authority to automatically convene and operationalize an Emergency Platform in the event of complex global shocks of significant scale, severity and reach;
- ❖ Decide that the Emergency Platform would not be a standing body or institution but a set of protocols that could be activated in the event of a complex global crisis;
- ❖ Decide that the SG will convene the Emergency Platform in response to a complex global shock in consultation with the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council, if appropriate, the relevant national authorities and regional organizations and the relevant UN entities, specialized agencies, IFIs and other multilateral institutions that are mandated to respond in the event of sector-specific crises;
- ❖ Decide that, in the event of a complex global shock, the SG is requested to convene an Emergency Platform with the objective of –

- i. Providing high-level political leadership by convening relevant actors to respond to complex global shocks;
- ii. Ensuring an international response on the basis of solidarity and equity;
- iii. Leading the multilateral system's response to a complex global shock to ensure a coherent and coordinated response;
- iv. Leading a multi-stakeholder forum that can bring together all relevant actors that can contribute to the response;
- v. Leading high-level advocacy and strategic communications in response to the complex global shock, including by ensuring timely, accurate data, analysis and policy recommendations;
- vi. Securing clear commitments from key actors to support directly and immediately the global response to a complex shock;
- vii. Ensuring accountability for the delivery on commitments and pledges from all participating actors.

- ❖ Recall Chapter IX of the Charter of the United Nations, and request that all multilateral participants in an Emergency Platform – including IFIs, UN specialized agencies and UN agencies, funds and programmes – should cooperate with and report to the SG when undertaking activities that contribute to a whole-of-system response to a complex global shock, with the aim of strengthening multilateral coordination, while recognizing that multilateral entities that participate in an Emergency Platform remain fully accountable to their respective governing bodies for delivering on their individual mandates;
- ❖ Agree that, once activated, an Emergency Platform should be convened for a finite period determined by the type of shock and that, at the end of that period, the SG may extend the Emergency Platform for such time as necessary;
- ❖ Request that, once an Emergency Platform has been convened, the SG provides regular reporting to the GA on its activities;

**RESOURCE** – [Policy Brief on an Emergency Platform](#)

**Figure: Emergency Platform Process Flow and Response**



## Informal Consultations with Member States on the Policy Brief on the Emergency Platform (16 March 2023)

**ABOUT** – Following the publication of the policy Brief on the Emergency Platform by the SG, the SOTF co-facilitators – Germany and Namibia – organized consultations with stakeholders and MS on 16 March 2023 in the morning and afternoon, respectively. The consultations are one among the many planned by the SOTF co-facilitators in the lead-up to the SOTF Ministerial in September 2023 and the SOTF in 2024.

### FREQUENTLY MENTIONED POINTS

During the consultation, there was broad recognition that the global response mechanism to multi-sectoral global shocks, like COVID-19, is inadequate and that it needs to be swift, more coherent and coordinated. The Emergency Platform, as proposed by the SG in his policy brief, was thus received on a positive note. There was consensus among many MS that the Emergency Platform should not duplicate the work or functions of existing UN agencies, mechanisms and coordination bodies with some MS raising the risk of duplication/need for complementarity with the functions of ECOSOC, IASC and the GA. While mobilizing the UN system through the Emergency Platform was not opposed, MS were particular about not infringing on the mandates of individual agencies and that individual agencies remain accountable to their respective governing bodies. Over the course of the discussion, there were many requests for clarity and additional information on the proposal from the SG, which was pointed out by the representative of Brazil as – “the vagueness in many parts of the document (Policy Brief) and the many doubts raised here even in a preliminary view of the document, our first reaction is one of caution.”

### HIGHLIGHTS

| Key Areas Discussed  | Views of MS   |
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| <i>Terminologies used in the Policy Brief and definition of a “global shock”</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Pakistan</b> – With regard to some of the language that is being used here and we need to underline that this language is a) not endorsed so far and b) not clear at all. This response (<i>reference</i>) to multi-stakeholder participation, we are not very clear what this means.</li> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – We believe that it would be helpful to develop a glossary of definitions of relevant concepts and terms used in that document to be operative definitions for the design and implementation of that platform.</li> <li>• <b>Morocco</b> – In the policy brief, global shocks are defined as events with severely disruptive consequences for a big proportion or significant proportion of the world population, so it is very clear what this platform is meant to do.</li> <li>• <b>India</b> – The definition of global shocks needs more clarity and understanding.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – Question of requiring a better definition of what could constitute a complex global shock of the nature that would be responded to through an emergency platform – there is inherent difficulty in that type of definition, because it is, I think, axiomatic that future shocks are not knowable; their precise character will be difficult, if impossible to predict, but we do have to work on a set of criteria and thresholds that we would be able to reduce, to try to give a better response to this definitional issue. These matters can of course be addressed in the process of formulating the terms of the standing authority that might be attributed by the GA to the SG.</li> </ul> |
| <i>Relationship with the GA</i>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Pakistan</b> – The standing authority to the SG to convene such an Emergency Platform in response to complex emergencies is a good thing. We understand that this would be intergovernmentally approved, moved or intergovernmentally endorsed on a case-by-case basis and that's of course as it should be, since MS should make the final decisions.</li> </ul>   |

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Australia</b> – The SG provides regular reporting to the GA on its activities. We would suggest that in addition to this, at the close of each Emergency Platform, the SG should brief the GA on the efficacy and efficiency of the Emergency Platform.</li> <li>• <b>Sri Lanka</b> – It is a well-established principle that unbridled or carte blanche exercise of discretion in the best of hands is anathema to the rule of law, so we need to be careful – we are not saying that we shouldn't do it, but we need to be ultra cautious in doing so. If that kind of unbridled discretion is to be vested in any person, it must be, and I say it, has to be confined to certain checks and balances of the strictest kind.</li> <li>• <b>United States</b> – We very much like the idea of reporting to the GA and the idea of a review after the use of the Emergency Platform and think this would be particularly important after the first time such a platform was stood up to get a sense of whether or not the very idea of the concept is living up to its expectations and how it might need to be refined.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – It would seem to be a good practice to ensure that if and when a platform is activated, it would be subject to regular or appropriate reporting by the Secretariat to MS at appropriate intervals and most particularly at that point where the platform will be deactivated.</li> </ul> |
| <p><i>Stakeholders/members who can be considered for membership</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – Would it only be relevant national authorities? Would it only be those of the state or the states that are directly affected? and we're wondering whether that's the right course of action.</li> <li>• <b>China</b> – The operation of Emergency Platform cannot be disassociated from the intergovernmental and international nature of the organization. We welcome multi-stakeholders contributions and inputs in terms of crisis response, but on issues pertaining to the participation modalities and accountability among others, full deliberation by MS are required each time the platform is activated or convened.</li> <li>• <b>South Africa</b> – If created, the Emergency Platform should allow equal participation by all MS and not collusions of wielding MS. The role of the SG and that of MS should be well-defined.</li> <li>• <b>Georgia</b> – Emphasize that the platform should galvanize all relevant stakeholders that have the potential to contribute to the effective emergency responses this will help us to tackle multi-dimensional threats with a multi-dimensional response.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – The SG has reiterated of course that you as MS are they decision-makers in these matters, but that there is benefit and there is added value to appropriate multi-stakeholders to be accountable to and be involved, as appropriate, in the work of these platforms.</li> </ul>    |
| <p><i>Criteria for Activation</i></p>                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – It would be necessary to have greater detail as to the procedures and particular attention should be granted to the process flow to activate that platform.</li> <li>• <b>Mexico</b> – We'd like to stress our concern on what would constitute an emergency justifying the establishment of a platform. While the brief mentions several examples of complex global crises, the dimensions of a crisis could generate inaccurate interpretations and different understandings depending on the context.</li> <li>• <b>Georgia</b> – We believe that it is important to equip the SG with the standing authority to expeditiously convene and operationalize the Emergency Platform, which will be authorized by the decision of the GA.</li> <li>• <b>Canada</b> – We will need to clearly define the thresholds for activation and deactivation.</li> <li>• <b>United Kingdom</b> – It would be good to better understand the threshold for activating the Emergency Platform. In our view, the Emergency Platform should be reserved for exceptionally rare and short-term, not chronic circumstances. When that established threshold has been breached and when existing mechanisms and mandates do not have the capacity to respond.</li> </ul>   |

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| <i>Closure of the Emergency Platform</i>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sri Lanka</b> – Once activated, there is also perhaps no sunset clause.</li> <li>• <b>Japan</b> – We hope to qualify on several points including the mechanism of review after each platform to ensure its effectiveness, efficiency and transparency so that the platform could be improved.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – The fact that the platform would not be a standing body, but rather a mechanism convened, also means that there should be sunset clauses attached to it. It would be of a determined length of time based on need and therefore a period of deactivation would be part of the overall process.</li> </ul> |
| <i>Accountability</i>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Russian Federation</b> – It’s unclear where accountability comes into this – who will they be accountable to.</li> <li>• <b>Australia</b> supports the idea of accountability mechanisms that encourage collaboration and joined up efforts. We see value in greater detail on how the Emergency Platform can ensure this buy-in and accountability to achieve cross-sectoral collective response when it is needed.</li> </ul>   |
| <i>Funding for the Emergency Platform</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>United Kingdom</b> – Neither the mobilizing of, nor the support of the platform, should require regular budgets.</li> <li>• <b>Indonesia</b> – Resource mobilization also becomes our shared significant challenge especially to assist developing countries. To this extent, intensifying dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions is critical to ensure resilience as well as to form stronger and well-coordinated actions.</li> </ul>   |

## RESOURCES

1. [Emergency Platform Policy Brief](#)

4. [Australia](#)
5. [Canada](#)
6. [China](#)
7. [Mexico](#)
8. [Norway](#)
9. [Panama](#)
10. [South Africa](#)
11. [Sri Lanka](#)
12. [Vietnam](#)

## Statements

2. [UNDRR](#)
3. [Cuba on behalf of G77 and China](#)

## KEY REMARKS

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| <p>Opening Remarks by Guy Rider, Under-Secretary-General for Policy</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ The scope and agenda of the SOTF will be entirely determined by MS. The policy briefs are to offer MS food for thought and to provide you with some ambitious and even provocative elements for your consideration.</li> <li>✚ The SDG Summit is the centerpiece of the high-level week. The SOTF will build upon the SDG summit – it will fill gaps and address the new challenges which are coming to us thick and fast.</li> <li>✚ The EP would not be a standing body or entity, but rather, as has been recalled already a set of protocols that could be activated when a complex global shock strikes.</li> <li>✚ The EP would not displace or duplicate in any manner the work of other intergovernmental bodies and that would include the Security Council and the GA, nor would it interfere with the mandate of specialized agencies or existing emergency response mechanisms.</li> <li>✚ We must be honest that our current arrangements for responding to complex global shocks have not proven to be fully effective, they fall short.</li> <li>✚ While decisions would of course continue to be made by MS, the EP would also include the private sector, civil society and other non-state partners with an ability to contribute meaningfully to the global response.</li> </ul> |
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| <p>Remarks by Achim Steiner, Under-Secretary-General and UNDP Administrator</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ First time in years the Human Development Index, measuring a nation's health, education and standard of living has declined globally for two years in a row as multiple crises have hit, some would even say that we are back to levels of 2016.</li> <li>✚ The global crisis response group on food, energy and finance, which was rapidly convened by the SG contributed in bringing food and fertilizer back to the markets through the Black Sea Grain Initiative with a clearly stabilizing impact felt on a local village market for grains, somewhere across the world within days.</li> <li>✚ Development actors will have a critical role to play in any response and will need to be engaged from the outset. Any response mechanism must be inclusive so as to allow all relevant actors to meaningfully contribute to a global response.</li> <li>✚ The multilateral system of the future aiming to address crisis through a multi-dimensional approach must be equipped with more inclusive platforms that bring together expertise and capacities from across the system and for the benefit of all, informed by mandates, but also by capability and capacity to act</li> <li>✚ To heed the lessons of COVID-19, the multilateral system must have greater convening protocols.</li> </ul>   |
| <p><a href="#">Mami Mizutori</a>, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction and Head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ The UNDRR sees alignment between the proposals in the policy brief and our own findings and insights, specifically around the need for a multi-sectoral risk governance and the adoption of a multi-hazard risk perspective.</li> <li>✚ The Sendai framework and the Emergency Platform are entirely complementary.</li> <li>✚ The findings of the mid-term review of the Sendai framework show that countries are failing to prevent future disasters by building back better from past ones. To build back better and become more resilient we must internalize and apply these lessons from past crisis to effectively address multi-dimensional and interconnected risks coherently and comprehensively.</li> </ul>   |
| <p>Remarks by Ramesh Rajasingham, Head and Representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Humanitarian assistance cannot resolve the causes and drivers of need. All we can aim to do is to mitigate the impact of global shocks on the most vulnerable. Ultimately, we're just a Band-Aid but never the solution and that Band-Aid is getting increasingly overstretched.</li> <li>✚ To ensure the level of humanitarian need does not rise to ever more unsustainable levels we need to devise mechanisms that ensure more timely, effective and equitable responses to global shocks – a mechanism that mobilizes political will at the highest level; a mechanism that is flexible enough to bring the right response actors to the table, including the private sector, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional organizations, civil society depending on the specific nature of any given shock or crisis.</li> <li>✚ OCHA stand ready to contribute its humanitarian expertise to the EP within the framework of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). As such, the IASC can be an essential actor to advise and work in complementary ways with the EP, which will be more multi-disciplinary in its composition and outlook.</li> <li>✚ We would encourage you to place a premium on ensuring that the mechanisms you will establish in the end are flexible and nimble enough to launch a response that is both fast and tailored to the crisis at any given time.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Main Takeaways from the Stakeholder Consultations as mentioned by Ambassador Antje Leendertse of Germany</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ We had a shared sense of recognition for the need of strengthening the coordinated sector-wide global response to complex shocks which is often perceived as too fragmented and impoverished.</li> <li>✚ Many stakeholders share the view that the EP should not displace or duplicate the work of intergovernmental bodies and that it should not interfere with the mandates of specialized agencies or existing mechanisms. They strongly argued that the scope of the platform should be limited to intended purposes and be understood as a select response tool in order to avoid mission-creep.</li> <li>✚ Strong linkages to risk reporting, early warning and forecasting data and tools should be insured, but not bundled into a collective tool.</li> <li>✚ Various civil society organizations mentioned the importance of a networked and inclusive approach to multilateralism which should take into account the voices and</li> </ul>  |



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|   | <p>perspectives of different stakeholders from the IFIs, the private sector, academia, local government, cities and youth, to name quite a few.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Some have suggested a link to the Declaration of Future Generations to ensure the long-term added value of a holistic tool for the multilateral system to support intergovernmental decisions and complement existing mechanisms.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Cuba on behalf of G77 and China</a> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We are not able to currently enter into substantive discussions on these two policy briefs, but we would be prepared to do so later on during the preparatory stage for the SOTF. We'd like to underscore that sufficient time has not been given to evaluate the policy briefs and to receive instructions from capitals and to coordinate our positions.</li> <li>✦ We further take note of the fact that this meeting is being held one week after the distribution of the two policy briefs and that some of the elements contained therein are of great complexity and have implications for the overall work of the UN, they must therefore be adequately reviewed and considered by MS.</li> <li>✦ Preparations for the SOTF should be conducted based on what MS have agreed in resolution 76/307. That agreement is limited to holding the Summit in 2024, where the preparatory Ministerial Meeting in 2023 and to initiate open, transparent and inclusive intergovernmental consultations on the preparatory process as per OP 16 of that resolution.</li> <li>✦ Reiterate the need to have further information and clarity on when we will discuss the overall purpose of and the preparations leading up to the ministerial meeting in 2023 as mandated by resolution 76/307 – taking into consideration that we only have six months until that meeting we propose to start intergovernmental consultations in that regard.</li> <li>✦ On a similar note, the group believes that we should avoid overlaps with other very important processes that are taking place with clear intergovernmental mandates. The group regrets that this meeting is being held on the same day as the second informal consultation on the political declaration for the SDG summit.</li> <li>✦ If the SOTF is to be truly successful and its preparatory process truly inclusive, it would be unwise to put smaller delegations in the difficult position of choosing which processes to follow and engage in.</li> </ul> |
| European Union                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We welcome that such a platform is not designed as a permanent or standing body or entity, but rather be made up of a set of protocols within the UN and beyond including on decision-making.</li> <li>✦ It is crucial in order to avoid duplication and to ensure enhanced synergies, including in the health sector with ongoing discussions happening in Geneva.</li> <li>✦ To respond to the severity and complexity of future global shocks, the platform must be inclusive, gathering inputs from a variety of stakeholders; interdisciplinary; multi-sectoral and fit-for-purpose by mobilizing the right set of actors, technical expertise and adequate resources, including those of local actors.</li> <li>✦ Once the platform is activated, it makes best use of available foresight and early warning data analysis to provide for evidence-based and informed decisions throughout the response.</li> </ul>   |
| Argentina                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ My delegation is currently making the necessary consultations with our capital.</li> <li>✦ We hope to be able to benefit from the necessary clarity and notice, so that before any virtual or in-person meetings we are able to substantially contribute to the negotiations.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Australia</a>                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We will closely consider the recommendations for MS, but we view the proposed protocols as reasonable with specific and defined scope to allow an Emergency Platform that would be flexible to respond to crisis, while not creating a financial burden or duplicating existing bodies and mandates.</li> <li>✦ Emergency Platform should be subject to review after use to ensure that it is working effectively. The SG provides regular reporting to the GA on its activities.</li> <li>✦ We would suggest that in addition to this at the close of each Emergency Platform, the SG should brief the GA on the efficacy and efficiency of the Emergency Platform function itself to capture those lessons learned and to propose improvements to the process for future Emergency Platforms.</li> <li>✦ Australia supports the idea of accountability mechanisms that encourage collaboration and joined up efforts. We see value in greater detail on how the</li> </ul>  |

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|                        | Emergency Platform can ensure this buy-in and accountability to achieve cross-sectoral collective response when it is needed.   |
| Brazil                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ In light of the short time that we had to react to this paper, I would be venturing into pointing some areas where we think that it's critical that we improve <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. One is the standing authority idea and the lack of consultations with the membership</li> <li>2. There is the uncertainty around the concept of sufficiently complex crisis</li> <li>3. The potential conflict of interest involving other stakeholders in the platform</li> <li>4. The question of funding</li> <li>5. The need for review and sunset clauses during the operation of such platform</li> <li>6. The issue of accountability, which should cover all participants including stakeholders that are going to take this stage of the UN should in some way be accountable.</li> </ol> </li> <li>✚ As a first step for us to learn what multi-stakeholderism is, we would suggest an act of transparency and see a list of those who contributed to the preparation of this policy paper which are referred only in general terms in the annex of the document, so we can see perhaps whether or not the positions of the South were contemplated.</li> <li>✚ The vagueness in many parts of the document and the many doubts raised here, even in a preliminary view of the document, our first reaction is one of caution.</li> </ul> |
| <a href="#">Canada</a> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ First leveraging existing capacities and mechanisms in the design of this platform will be critical, as will a balance between individual agencies remaining accountable to their respective governing bodies while ensuring an effective whole of system response.</li> <li>✚ Still not certain that we have a common understanding of the problem that we're trying to solve. In this sense more detailed information on concrete lessons learned and the establishment and operations of existing coordination mechanisms will be essential.</li> <li>✚ We will need to clearly define the thresholds for activation and deactivation and agree with others in this room on the importance of building a review of such a platform to examine the effectiveness and capture lessons learned.</li> <li>✚ We're particularly interested in hearing from the Secretariat on the considerable amount of work and reflection on existing mechanisms, lessons learned and options that will be important to our deliberations.</li> </ul>   |
| Chile                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No one has argued against the need to improve multilateral coordination to global shocks with the UN at the center.</li> <li>✚ I think that it seems evident that this is an area in which multilateralism has been left on the side and we need to improve our procedures. The parameters and the terms of these crises need to, of course be clearly defined.</li> </ul>   |
| <a href="#">China</a>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ First, China supports the UN in steering and coordinating international community's response to a major global crisis and welcomes the UN's facilitating and convening role in this regard.</li> <li>✚ Second, the operation of the Emergency Platform and the proper functioning of the various agencies of the UN system should be complementary and supportive to each other without introducing duplication into or interfering with the existing ongoing efforts.</li> <li>✚ If the platform's mandate originates from the General Assembly, then the GA should review the operation and effectiveness of the platform and the SG shall be requested to issue regular reports.</li> <li>✚ Third, the operation of Emergency Platform cannot be disassociated from the intergovernmental and international nature of the organization. We welcome multi-stakeholders contributions and inputs in terms of crisis response, but on issues pertaining to the participation modalities and accountability among others, full deliberation by MS are required each time the platform is activated or convened.</li> <li>✚ The SG should in a timely manner share with MS information on the multi-stakeholder participation.</li> </ul>  |

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| Egypt     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We took a very positive note of the two rich policy briefs issued by the SG and the Secretariat which we consider great food for thought and continue to study them as valuable inputs among others for our deliberations and discussions.</li> <li>✦ As highlighted by the G77 and China, we believe and we're happy to start with the consultations on the scope of the summit.</li> </ul>   |
| Georgia   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Emergency Platform is a very timely and much needed initiative. In the same way we welcome the view underlined in the policy brief that the Emergency Platform won't be a standing body or entity, but a set of protocols, we believe that it is important to equip the SG with the standing authority to expeditiously convene and operationalize the Emergency Platform, which will be authorized by the decision of the GA.</li> <li>✦ Emphasize that the platform should galvanize all relevant stakeholders that have the potential to contribute to the effective emergency response. This will help us to tackle multi-dimensional threats with a multi-dimensional response.</li> </ul>  |
| Holy See  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ First, the proposed platform should be based on the principles of equity and solidarity ensuring that those with least capacity to deal with global emergencies receive necessary and adequate support.</li> <li>✦ The definition of complex global shock, which so far has not been agreed intergovernmentally appears to be rather broad. For this reason, efforts should be devoted to establishing clear criteria to determine what constitutes a complex global shock, thus reducing the risk of arbitrariness in determining the threshold.</li> <li>✦ My delegation would like to seek further clarification on several practical elements related to the operationalization of the platform. For example, it would be important to elucidate the role of states in the process of consultation and activation of the platform. Similarly, it would be essential to outline the extent of engagement and the roles including on matters related to coordination of different stakeholders.</li> <li>✦ Once the platform is activated it would be vital to avoid duplications and overlaps.</li> <li>✦ This Mission recalls that the ECOSOC, through its operational activities for development segment already provides overall coordination and guidance to the UN development system. Furthermore, the overall effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and impact of UN operational activities for development is assessed thoroughly in the quadrennial comprehensive policy review.</li> </ul> |
| India     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ The policy brief at the outset appears to be providing an unidimensional approach to respond to the global shocks. It does not provide a set of options for member's considerations.</li> <li>✦ We note the USG's remarks that there may be other approaches that MS can consider. I think this is important as we deliberate on the policy briefs and our roadmap for the SOTF. We need to look at other approaches as well.</li> <li>✦ The definition of global shocks needs more clarity and understanding.</li> </ul>  |
| Indonesia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We deem necessary of clarity on the mechanism; of platform activation, especially on determining the severity and the complexity of the shocks.</li> <li>✦ Resource mobilization also becomes our shared significant challenge especially to assist developing countries. To this extent, intensifying dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions is critical to ensure resilience as well as to form stronger and well-coordinated actions.</li> <li>✦ Data and facts should also be the basis of decision-making process and resource deployment to better and effectively addressing the crisis.</li> </ul>   |
| Intl IDEA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Process allowing for inclusive participation and transparency during crisis decision-making processes is sometimes even more important than the substance of decisions.</li> <li>✦ Electoral processes and institutions should be recognized as critical infrastructure in democratic societies. Such recognition ensures that democratic institutions are protected during crisis.</li> </ul>   |
| Interpol  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ To combat the rising threat of cybercrime, Interpol has created the Global Cyber Incidence Response Team to help coordinate the law enforcement response to major cyber incidents.</li> <li>✦ Interpol can deploy a specialized team to provide so-called just-in-time trainings for law enforcement in response to natural, accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks.</li> </ul>  |

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|                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Interpol's Bio Tracker – a tool that assesses and tracks biological threats around the world – can be used as an early warning system for high impact events involving a biological agent whether they occur naturally or deliberately.</li> </ul>   |
| Japan                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ We are generally supportive of the idea to enhance coordination among key and relevant actors to respond to crisis.</li> <li>✚ We hope to qualify on several points including the mechanism of review after each platform to ensure its effectiveness, efficiency and transparency so that the platform could be improved.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Mexico</a> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ We'd like to stress our concern on what would constitute an emergency justifying the establishment of a platform. While the brief mentions several examples of complex global crises, the dimensions of a crisis could generate inaccurate interpretations and different understandings depending on the context.</li> <li>✚ This is an important issue that should be addressed before forging ahead with any new structure. Whether or not changes would be needed to the UN Charter to have a potential to give a potential Emergency Platform the necessary tools to take the precautionary or reactive measures needed, if such a reform isn't needed, we're wondering whether or not the platform could have a similar mandate to those of peacekeeping operations, in that case perhaps it should have joint mandates from the Security Council and from ECOSOC.</li> <li>✚ An effective Emergency Platform should avoid as we've heard before, establishing additional bureaucratic structures and should aim to coordinate existing resources.</li> </ul> |
| Morocco                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ We note with great interest the indications made by the SG Mr. António Guterres that this Emergency Platform will not replace the bodies, institutions and organ mechanisms already existing, but will further strengthen them.</li> <li>✚ In the policy brief, global shocks are defined as events with severely disruptive consequences for a big proportion or significant proportion of the world population, so it is very clear what this platform is meant to do.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Norway</a> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Any discussion on an Emergency Platform should therefore also include how such a platform can incorporate efforts for prevention and preparedness, in addition to response.</li> <li>✚ The Emergency Platform is an opportunity to improve our collective approach to crisis management and it must complement existing multilateral, regional, national and other mechanisms.</li> <li>✚ One question for our further discussion is the modalities and criterion that would activate and convene the platform, and its financing.</li> </ul>  |
| Oman                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ In principle we would like to say that we are pro establishing an Emergency Platform. Two points of concern that I would like to focus in, <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Launching this platform would not necessarily mean in any way whatsoever that we have to be overlapping with the idea of seeking approvals and sanctions for a humanitarian intervention and if such a platform is approved it has to operate as per these stringent robust adherence to the provisions of the UN Charter.</li> <li>2. We need to learn more information in order to be distanced from the power and authority of the Security Council, so that humanitarian interventions would never be politicized.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>   |
| Pakistan               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ We would like to caution against indigestion from too much food for thought being presented all at once.</li> <li>✚ Firstly, I think we need to have a better definition of what are the kind of emergencies that we are talking about and that these do not overlap into the mandates of the Security Council or the GA.</li> <li>✚ My delegation, as a developing country would be very interested to know if these kind of emergencies that are envisaged cover economic emergencies of the sort that we are currently facing.</li> <li>✚ Secondly, I think the standing authority to the SG to convene such Emergency Platform in response to complex emergencies is a good thing. We understand that this would be intergovernmentally approved, moved or intergovernmentally</li> </ul>  |

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|                              | <p>endorsed on a case-by-case basis and that's of course as it should be since MS should make the final decisions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Thirdly, we also agree that there should be some kind of protocols or what we would call in Pakistan, Standard Operating Procedures, which would be followed with regard to the convening of such platforms.</li> <li>✦ With regard to some of the language that is being used here and we need to underline that this language is a) not endorsed so far and b) not clear at all. This response (<i>reference</i>) to multi-stakeholder participation, we are not very clear what this means.</li> <li>✦ This concept of networked multilateralism, again this is something that we have not endorsed in any intergovernmental document or has been clarified to us as to what this means. And I don't think that new things should be introduced in a coded language which is not clear and not endorsed by MS.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Panama</a>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Generally speaking, we agree and we support the initiative. However, it would be necessary to have greater detail as to the procedures and particular attention should be granted to the process flow to activate that platform.</li> <li>✦ We believe that it would be helpful to develop a glossary of definitions of relevant concepts and terms used in that document to be operative definitions for the design and implementation of that platform.</li> <li>✦ Would it only be relevant national authorities? Would it only be those of the state or the states that are directly affected? and we're wondering whether that's the right course of action.</li> <li>✦ Furthermore, if the activation is automatic, we're not sure when the bodies mentioned in the brief would be consulted would that be after activation or before, if in that case it wouldn't be automatic.</li> <li>✦ The task is to identify when we need to act? how this action would be approved and which actors would be able to, and would have the resources to support, and above all to ensure an effective, consistent and organized reaction, and the most important thing, a timely reaction.</li> <li>✦ Procedures must be clear and consensus-based to ensure that they have necessary global political backing to give it legitimacy.</li> </ul> |
| Russian Federation           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ Positive aspects include the need to prepare regular global reports about risks. Such a report is already being prepared, maybe it's named differently.</li> <li>✦ In addressing crises, there's a need to take into account the priorities of the host government and there's another good idea which is the creation of a targeted roster of experts. But our view is that such rosters already exist.</li> <li>✦ The platform is not a structure, but they're proposing it be operationalized. It's impossible to operationalize a protocol if there is no structure involved.</li> <li>✦ It's unclear where accountability comes into this – who will they be accountable to. In other words, they're speaking quite a bit about the fact that the work of the GA and the Security Council will not be duplicated, but in the more detailed clarifications you can see that it will duplicate these work.</li> </ul>   |
| Singapore                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ My delegation wants to express the view that preliminary consultations such as the one today on the policy briefs are complementary to the discussions on the scope for the SOTF.</li> <li>✦ Three criteria by which we are assessing the proposals and recommendations <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do the ideas help us to implement and accelerate implementation of the SDG goals?</li> <li>2. Do the ideas and policy briefs contribute to strengthening the UN and the multilateral system, especially in terms of delivery of service to people on the ground?</li> <li>3. Do the ideas and proposals and the policy briefs help in terms of inclusiveness especially helping those countries that require the most assistance and adjusting the needs of the SIDS and LDCs?</li> </ol> </li> <li>✦ We see the concept of the Emergency Platform which seeks to strengthen the response system of the UN in situations of complex global shocks in and of itself for fulfilling the three criteria, so we view this proposal positively.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">South Africa</a> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ South Africa joins those who have said it should not duplicate other existing fora and institutions.</li> </ul>  |

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|                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ There should be a common understanding and criteria of what constitutes complex global shocks. This should be an inclusive criterion.</li> <li>✦ If created, the Emergency Platform should allow equal participation by all MS and not collusions of wielding MS. The role of the SG and that of MS should be well defined.</li> </ul>  |
| <a href="#">Sri Lanka</a>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We, as MS, should also decide on the scope and elements of the summit now. We believe that it is only then that we can delve into the substantive discussions. So, it is therefore essential that MS be given the space to identify and agree upon the scope and elements of the SOTF.</li> <li>✦ In the Preparatory Ministerial meeting this September, developing countries must have the space to decide our priorities; to decide what we want and those we do not want. It must be borne in mind that 137 of us are underdeveloped as the World Bank proclaims and 54 of us are in financial difficulty as the UNDP has already observed.</li> <li>✦ It is a well-established principle that unbridled or carte blanche exercise of discretion in the best of hands is anathema to the rule of law, so we need to be careful – we are not saying that we shouldn't do it but we need to be ultra cautious in doing so.</li> <li>✦ If that kind of unbridled discretion is to be vested in any person, it must be and I say it, has to be confined to certain checks and balances of the strictest kind.</li> <li>✦ There is also no mention of a review mechanism that would allow MS to review the work of the Emergency Platform. Once activated there is also perhaps no sunset clause.</li> <li>✦ Page 6 of the Policy Brief also outlines the possible future complex global shocks which does not include any aspects of the development agenda such as debt reform, IFIs, Financing for Development.</li> </ul> |
| Tunisia                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ The international response to COVID pandemic – from which many of us have not yet recovered yet – that response just attests to how desperately we need to be better prepared to address future shocks in a coherent and coordinated way; it tells us that the system is not working.</li> <li>✦ We see value in discussing the SG's proposal on Emergency Platforms and we feel like this issue needs to be discussed and considered in the SOTF, of course without prejudice to what MS can suggest as additional topics.</li> </ul>  |
| United Kingdom                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ It would be good to better understand the threshold for activating the Emergency Platform. In our view, the Emergency Platform should be reserved for exceptionally rare and short-term, not chronic circumstances. When that established threshold has been breached and when existing mechanisms and mandates do not have the capacity to respond. Where the Emergency Platform is deployed, it should respect those existing mechanisms and mandates.</li> <li>✦ Neither the mobilizing of, nor the support of the platform, should require regular budgets, nor should it be a standing body. Once the Emergency Platform has been established; it should be stood down at the earliest opportunity. We should plan to review the operation of the Emergency Platform after its use.</li> </ul>   |
| United States                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ We see utility in the idea of an Emergency Platform particularly in exceptional circumstances where the existing UN mechanisms are not equipped to adequately respond. We see value in the Emergency Platform's role in reinforcing the SG's existing convening authority; his ability to essentially wrangle the existing UN system as well as to bring in relevant external partners and stakeholders when necessary.</li> <li>✦ We very much like the idea of reporting to the GA and the idea of a review after the use of the Emergency Platform and think this would be particularly important after the first time such a platform was stood up to get a sense of whether or not the very idea of the concept is living up to its expectations and how it might need to be refined.</li> </ul>   |
| <a href="#">Vietnam</a>              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ To further discuss the proposed platform, we need to review existing UN emergency mechanisms in a comprehensive manner through an intergovernmental process.</li> <li>✦ We reiterate the importance of undertaking inclusive transparent consultation and enhancing cooperation among MS.</li> </ul>  |
| Closing Remarks by Guy Rider, Under- | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✦ There is really very strong convergence here about the need for the proposal that the SG has tabled in the policy brief in respect to the Emergency Platform.</li> </ul>  |

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| <p>Secretary-General for Policy</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ It is better to organize and to operate expeditiously and coherently on the basis of agreed mechanisms (agreed to by you) than to improvise in an unprepared manner.</li> <li>✚ You have heard this afternoon from my colleagues in UNDP, UNDRR and OCHA, that from their experience and in the light of the responsibilities that they hold, they see a significant advantage in proceeding along the lines proposed by the SG. There's been no suggestion that this would interfere with or weaken their own work, rather the contrary.</li> <li>✚ Question of requiring a better definition of what could constitute a complex global shock of the nature that would be responded to through an Emergency Platform, if the SG's proposals do find favor eventually, there is inherent difficulty in that type of definition because it is, I think, axiomatic that future shocks are not knowable; their precise character will be difficult, if impossible to predict, but we do have to work on a set of criteria and thresholds that we would be able to reduce, to try to give a better response to this definitional issue. These matters can of course be addressed in the process of formulating the terms of the standing authority that might be attributed by the GA to the SG.</li> <li>✚ It would seem to be a good practice to ensure that if and when a platform is activated, it would be subject to regular or appropriate reporting by the Secretariat to MS at appropriate intervals and most particularly at that point where the platform will be deactivated.</li> <li>✚ The fact that the platform would not be a standing body, but rather a mechanism convened, also means that there should be sunset clauses attached to it. It would be of a determined length of time based on need and therefore a period of deactivation would be part of the overall process.</li> <li>✚ The SG has reiterated of course that you as MS are they decision-makers in these matters but that there is benefit and there is added value to appropriate multi-stakeholders to be accountable to and be involved in, as appropriate, the work of these platforms.</li> </ul> |
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### Abbreviations:

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| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council                       |
| EP     | Emergency Platform                                |
| GA     | General Assembly                                  |
| IASC   | Inter-Agency Standing Committee                   |
| IFI    | International Financial Institutions              |
| LDCs   | Least Developed Countries                         |
| MS     | Member States                                     |
| SDG    | Sustainable Development Goals                     |
| SG     | Secretary-General                                 |
| SIDS   | Small Island Developing States                    |
| SOTF   | Summit of the Future                              |
| UNDRR  | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| USG    | Under Secretary-General                           |

## Informal consultations on the Summit of the Future with Stakeholders (Emergency Platform; 16 March 2023)

**ABOUT:** *The stakeholder consultation on the Emergency Platform policy brief published by the SG was convened virtually by the co-Facilitators of the SOTF on 16 March 2023. The consultation was attended by Yaseer Baki from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) and around 90 representatives from civil society and major stakeholders with around 10 making an intervention. The consultations started with a short presentation by Yaseer Baki followed by interventions from CSOs.*

### HEADLINES

**Yaseer Baki, EOSG** – *emphasized that the ideas presented in the Emergency Platform Policy Brief are the SG’s proposals and the decision ultimately lies with the MS. The Policy Brief proposes that “the General Assembly (GA) provide the Secretary-General and the United Nations system with a standing authority to convene and operationalize automatically an Emergency Platform in the event of a future complex global shock of sufficient scale, severity and reach”. The Emergency Platform would not be a standing body or entity but a set of protocols that can be activated when required and will not duplicate existing institutional mechanisms like the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and others.*

*The Emergency Platform would strengthen the international response to complex global shocks that throw the SDGs off-track and thus contribute to the achievement of the SDGs. The current arrangements are sub-optimal and have proven to be ineffective to respond to multidimensional threats and shocks. Thus we need a multidimensional response mechanism that engages with a broad range of actors from the private sector, civil society, subject-matter experts, academics, and critically the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).*

**Ambassador Antje Leendertse, SOTF Co-Facilitator** – *encouraged the participants to consider the following guiding questions in their interventions. A) What are the impacts of the current COVID or cost-of-living crisis? B) What role can the UN play in such a crisis? C) And how can we ensure that the Emergency Platform proposal strengthens existing institutions?*

### CSO Interventions:

#### Role of the SG:

- ❖ *We support a stronger mandate for the SG in convening stakeholders, starting with the UN agencies, MS, CSOs, and also the media.*
- ❖ *We do not favor blanket authorization for the SG to convene non-state actors without intergovernmental oversight. Instead, we propose a Security Council-like body – a [Global Resilience Council](#) that can convene diverse stakeholders with intergovernmental oversight to deal with non-military threats.*
- ❖ *We must be cautious about possible biases regarding what constitutes a global shock and the threshold that triggers the activation of the Emergency Platform.*

#### Institutional Capabilities:

- ❖ *The Emergency Platform should have foresight capabilities to identify potential threats & risks and a plan that identifies the objectives, urgent policy measures, financials, and governance structure.*
- ❖ *Given the SG’s convening role in the Emergency Platform, it might be helpful to add certain institutional capabilities without duplicating existing mechanisms.*
- ❖ *A robust system of learning, building on the shortcomings and good practices of past and future emergencies will be vital for long-term success.*
- ❖ *There is a need to map, streamline and strengthen existing mechanisms like the UN Chief Executives Board.*



## Inclusion:

- ❖ *Given that local governments will be on the frontlines of crisis response, local governments must have access to and be represented in decision-making forums. The Emergency Platform should adopt multilevel governance approaches based on the principle of subsidiarity.*
- ❖ *The lack of coordination at the local level we witnessed during the COVID-19 response shows us the importance of local actors and the need to improve local coordination.*
- ❖ *Welcome the Emergency Platform proposal but would like to raise the issue of the lack of consultations with CSOs during the formulation of the Policy Brief. We demand that CSOs are consulted and real-time data is incorporated into the decision-making processes of the Emergency Platform.*
- ❖ *The Emergency Platform must not leave behind people with non-communicable diseases.*

## Other:

- ❖ *Out of a desire to do the most good, there is also a tendency to engage in mission creep - the emergency platform should ensure it is limited to the scope for which it is intended.*
- ❖ *More clarity is needed on how those responsible for generating the crisis are held accountable.*
- ❖ *The Emergency Platform must be based on human rights, respect for languages and take an intergenerational approach.*
- ❖ *Upcoming Policy Briefs need to consider education and the Emergency Platform must take into account the speedy recovery and continued provision of education for children in crisis settings.*
- ❖ *We urge action to the drought in South Africa with FAO taking the lead and by integrating technology.*

**Response from Yaseer Baki, EOSG** – *The Emergency Platform is a response mechanism. Resilience, preparedness, forecasting and early warning need to be done before the crisis strikes and should not be bundled together with the Emergency Platform. Regarding the Sendai framework, it is a normative framework to reduce risk, but once the disaster strikes we need a response mechanism. Also, the existing coordination mechanisms such as the IASC or the WHO are sector-specific, thus we need a multisectoral response mechanism. To respond to future crises we will need inclusive and networked multilateralism, which brings in those who need to be engaged to the table, including local governments and cities. We are currently not doing it systematically in the multilateral system.*

## Additional Interventions from CSOs:

- ❖ *We are currently facing structural mega-crisis and complex shocks; thus the response should be at that scale. Thus we propose a [second Security Council-like body](#) to deal with non-military threats.*
- ❖ *There is no lack of coordination mechanisms, but there is an additional need to engage across government ministries and also soft enforcement mechanisms. The COVAX facility was indeed a multistakeholder body with limited success and is not clear what a new coordination mechanism can do regarding rising prices.*
- ❖ *The conflict of interest in bringing external stakeholders must be reviewed by the intergovernmental system and we must be vigilant of corporate interests seeking to benefit from the outcome of the Emergency Platform*
- ❖ *It would be wrong to pin all our hopes on the Emergency Platform because it is the new proposal in town. We need to also focus on improving existing mechanisms, reorganizing systems and increasing resources for them.*
- ❖ *The Emergency Platform must offer a supportive environment for grassroots women's voices to be heard and UN agencies can help by documenting best practices on the same.*

*The German Co-Facilitator closed the session on a positive note and gave the following contact information for further inputs. The next stakeholder consultations will be on the High-Level Advisory Board report on 27<sup>th</sup> April.*

Contact: [sotf@namibiaunmission.org](mailto:sotf@namibiaunmission.org) and [sotf@newy.diplo.de](mailto:sotf@newy.diplo.de)